By Jacob C. Maichel
To the average person prison gangs seem like the epitome of chaos. Prison customs and beliefs appear completely irrational to the average person, however when understood through the rational choice paradigm we can begin to understand this robust illicit economy. There are two components to rational choice theory that help us interpret inmate actions. First people are self centered and pursue what they value. This does not mean that people do not help others as some pursue altruistic ends they find valuable. The second point is that individuals respond to changes in costs and benefits. If an action gets more costly people will do less of it, and vice versa. Subjective preferences help people decide how to weigh costs and benefits, and can not be ignored when looking at peoples decisions. It is not helpful to ignore inmates preferences just because we do not share them. Economics sheds light on how people satisfy their unlimited desires with limited resources without naively assuming only money matters. Prison gangs have not always been present in the American penal system so understanding the factors that give rise to their growth is key to seeing prisoners as rational actors.
One explanation for prison gangs is the demand for services that they provide. Governments exist to provide many vital services to the people. Three of these services allow our markets to operate; defining private property rights, promoting voluntary exchange, and encouraging collective action. Those in prison lack formal access to the governance mechanisms that we enjoy. The absence of a legitimate government allows for organizations or norm based systems to fulfill these needs. Historically decentralized norms have been sufficient to self govern prisoners prior to the rise of prison gangs.
Norms help to identify what is socially permissible behavior, such as holding the door open for others. There is no official law to decide on these informal rules but instead they develop over time, an inexpensive way to govern. This style of governance works until populations get too large and it becomes too costly to remember all the information of what is and isn't acceptable. Organization can then arise to solve many of the problems norms address, but through centralized processes.
Prior to the 1970's the set of norms that existed in the US prison system is generally referred to the "convict code", based on the ideals of never helping officials while respecting other inmates. These norms arose as prisoners had to find ways to engage in mutually beneficial behaviors with strangers, without this contraband markets would be nonexistent. Prior to prison populations proliferation in the 1960's decentralized punishment was easy and served as a powerful way to discourage dishonesty. While populations got larger they also became younger and more violent, breaking down the effectiveness of the convict code.
These shifting prison cultures derailed the convict code and paved the way for the rise of prison gangs. Gangs do not randomly form and instead fill power voids by creating mutually beneficial bonds between gang members. When normal governance does not work to protect private property rights organizations can instead offer protection and this happens outside of prison as well (historically the Italian Mafia is a strong example). David Skarbek in Social Order of the Underworld identifies The Mexican Mafia as the first prison gang, comprised of Hispanics largely from California street gangs. As they moved among prisons in California their influence spread and other gangs formed for protection and competition in illicit prison markets.
Another factor leading to the formation of gangs is the increasing demand for contraband. According to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation in 1959 26% of inmates reported a drug addiction compared to 82% in 1978. This large increase was caused in part by president Nixon's war on drugs which restructured many sentencing practices. These inmate consumers offer a massive profit motive for prison drug dealers who must be able to deter opportunistic behavior and ensure quality. Due to the inherent dangers of dealing contraband in prisons gangs have a comparative advantage in selling drugs over the individual. Gangs are very successful at making credible threats of violence to deter opportunistic behavior while enjoying extensive trafficking networks, benefiting from underworld economies of scale.
Prison gangs have many trading problems and solve them in a similar fashion to medieval towns. Medieval merchants typically were unsure of the trustworthiness of other traders, unaware of future transactions, and had no way to tarnish the reputation of dishonest traders. This was overcome with the community system where individual reputations were based on the reputation of their respective communities. This encouraged impersonal exchange and monitoring the behavior of your peers. Prison gangs serve the same purpose by facilitating trade with unknown partners based on gang reputations. The free rider problem arises in this situation where people will try to falsely claim membership for benefits. For this many different signals exist to distinguish members from non members, handshakes and tattoos being strong examples.
With the large prison populations and competing factions it should maybe come at no surprise that gangs have a strong foundation in race. Race is something that is very easy to identify and incredibly difficult to change. In a place where everyone is dressed the same 24 hours a day race offers a cheap method of identification. Groups could have formed around other similarities, such as religions. Alternative methods are much more difficult to learn and identify, making race one of the strongest ways to distinguish communities. Inmates with no previous racist behaviors are thrown into a segregated world and have to adapt or suffer. Skarbek, again in Social Order of the Underworld, suggests that new inmates are often approached within days of their arrival to inform them of the rules.
Prison gangs today play an important role in penal life. Gangs allocate valuable resources, such as recreational space. Some areas are preferred over others for quality of equipment or strategic reasons. Gangs often see violence as an effective way to resolve conflict over the use of such common areas. This further incentivizes gang membership for individuals to help time pass more comfortably. Prison gangs are also in charge of their members behavior, and it is in their best interest to maintain a healthy collective reputation- even if that means being feared. Punishment has internal mechanisms inside of gangs to resolve conflicts and disputes between individuals as well as in illicit markets. Due to the existence of these markets and the profitability of trade gangs have an incentive to actually minimize violence. Violence attracts attention and hinders ability to carry on normal operations, making nonviolent solutions the most profitable.
While gangs do provide many of the same functions as mutual aid societies they undeniably engage in a number of predatory acts as well. Rising populations and changing demographics have eroded the effectiveness of the convict code and gave rise the status quo. Gangs did not just come about, but rather met the demand for governance while also increasing the efficiency of the contraband market. Understanding supply and demand factors helps us understand why prisons gangs exist and why rational actors will engage in seemingly senseless acts. Afterall, it is not from the benevolence of the gang member that inmates expect their contraband, but from their regard to their own self interest.
Jacob C. Maichel is a Graduate Assistant at the Gwartney Institute and an MBA student at Ottawa University
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